

# Navigating Challenges in the Penta Helix Model: Collaborative Strategies and Obstacles in Countering Extremism in Surabaya, Indonesia

Prihandono Wibowo<sup>1\*</sup>, Renitha Dwi Hapsari<sup>2</sup>, Muchammad Chasif Ascha<sup>3</sup>, Salsa Febiola Gading Widjaya<sup>4</sup>, Afissa Hanani Octavia<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Surabaya, Indonesia; email:

prihandono\_wibowo.hi@upnjatim.ac.id

<sup>2</sup> Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Surabaya, Indonesia; email: renithadwi.hi@upnjatim.ac.id

<sup>3</sup> Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Surabaya, Indonesia; email: m.chasif.hi@upnjatim.ac.id

<sup>4</sup> Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Surabaya, Indonesia; email:

20044010035@student.upnjatim.ac.id

<sup>5</sup> Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Surabaya, Indonesia; email:

20044010125@student.upnjatim.ac.id

\* Correspondence

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**Abstract:** This study examines the challenges in implementing the Penta helix model to counter radicalism and terrorism in Surabaya, Indonesia. Given Surabaya's strategic importance and vulnerability to extremism, the research seeks to assess how collaboration among government, academia, media, civil society, and the private sector functions within this framework. Employing a descriptive-qualitative approach, data were gathered through semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, including law enforcement, religious leaders, civil society, and media representatives, supplemented by document analysis. The findings indicate that while the Penta helix strategy has been partially operationalised, several challenges remain. These include minimal involvement of the business sector, fragmented stakeholder coordination, budgetary limitations, and a notable absence of gender mainstreaming despite the involvement of women in previous terrorist acts. These limitations reduce the model's effectiveness in preventing and countering violent extremism. The study highlights the need to strengthen inter-sectoral collaboration by fully implementing the National Action Plan (RAN PE), institutionalising business sector contributions through CSR, and incorporating gender perspectives into local counter-terrorism policies. This research contributes to the discourse on collaborative governance in extremism prevention by offering a localised analysis of the Penta helix model. Its originality lies in identifying gender mainstreaming and private sector gaps as underexplored barriers, thereby extending existing knowledge on policy implementation at the municipal level.

**Keywords:** Collaborative strategies; counter-radicalism; gender mainstreaming; Penta helix; terrorism prevention.

**Abstrak:** Penelitian ini mengkaji tantangan dalam penerapan model Penta helix dalam upaya pencegahan radikalisme dan terorisme di Surabaya, Indonesia. Mengingat posisi strategis Surabaya yang rawan terhadap ekstremisme, studi ini berfokus pada bagaimana kolaborasi antar unsur pemerintah, akademisi, media, masyarakat sipil, dan sektor bisnis berjalan dalam kerangka tersebut. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah deskriptif-kualitatif dengan pengumpulan data melalui wawancara semi-terstruktur kepada para pemangku kepentingan utama, termasuk aparat

keamanan, tokoh agama, organisasi masyarakat, dan media, serta analisis dokumen kebijakan terkait. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa meskipun strategi Penta helix telah diadopsi sebagian, masih terdapat sejumlah kendala signifikan. Kendala tersebut meliputi minimnya keterlibatan sektor bisnis, lemahnya koordinasi antar pihak, keterbatasan anggaran, serta absennya pengarusutamaan gender meskipun perempuan pernah terlibat dalam aksi terorisme. Kondisi ini menyebabkan efektivitas model dalam mencegah ekstremisme kekerasan menjadi kurang optimal. Penelitian ini menekankan perlunya penguatan kolaborasi lintas sektor melalui optimalisasi implementasi RAN PE, institusionalisasi peran sektor bisnis melalui program CSR, serta integrasi perspektif gender dalam kebijakan penanggulangan terorisme di tingkat daerah. Kontribusi dari penelitian ini terletak pada analisis lokal terhadap pelaksanaan kebijakan Penta helix, serta pengungkapan keterbatasan dalam pengarusutamaan gender dan partisipasi sektor bisnis, dua aspek yang masih jarang dibahas dalam studi-studi terdahulu.

**Kata kunci:** strategi kolaboratif; kontra-radikalisme; pengarusutamaan gender; Pentahelix; pencegahan terorisme.

## 1. Introduction

Surabaya is one of Indonesia's largest cities, serving as a strategic centre for commerce and maritime activity. Its position as the capital of East Java Province strengthens its role as a nucleus of regional urbanisation (Indahri, 2017). Beyond its economic stature, Surabaya has received national and international recognition for effective governance and innovative public service delivery (Muluk & Pratama, 2021). The city hosts several vital state institutions, including the Brawijaya V Military Regional Command, Fleet Command II, and the Main Naval Base V. It also holds a unique place in national memory as the "City of Heroes," symbolising resistance during Indonesia's struggle for independence (Aji et al., 2023).

For many years, authorities and the public perceived Surabaya as a low-risk area for radicalism and terrorism. However, this perception shifted dramatically following a coordinated series of suicide bombings on May 13, 2018, targeting three churches and the city's police headquarters (Imaduddin, 2020). The perpetrators—members of a single family, including women and children—had ties to Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an extremist group aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Dass, 2021). These attacks prompted a series of arrests in Surabaya and neighbouring Sidoarjo, uncovering a broader extremist network (Tempo, 2021). ISIS subsequently claimed responsibility, thereby confirming its operational footprint in Indonesia (Schulze, 2018).

Between 2018 and 2023, security forces significantly intensified efforts to apprehend ISIS sympathisers in Surabaya. Analysts such as Sidney Jones have criticised the state's counter-terrorism approach for failing to dismantle ideological roots and prevent the emergence of new cells and lone-wolf actors (Montratama, 2018; Waliyanri & Syauqillah, 2022). The public procession conducted by the Khilafatul Muslimin group on May 29, 2022—promoting the vision of an Islamic caliphate—underscored the persistent appeal of radical ideologies (Asiyah & Hakim, 2022). Additionally, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), although formally banned, continues to influence public discourse in Surabaya through informal channels (Santoso & Dharmawan, 2021). Individuals with prior HTI affiliations often perceive the dissemination of their ideas as a normalised practice.

A comprehensive, multi-sectoral response is essential to counter these developments. The Indonesian National Resilience Council has introduced the Penta helix collaboration model, which contains five sectors government, academia, media, civil society, and the private sector. This model is intended to enhance social resilience through coordinated actions against radicalisation and terrorism. In Surabaya, the municipal government has adopted the Penta helix model, with Mayor Eri Cahyadi promoting inter-sectoral collaboration as a cornerstone of the city's counter-extremism strategy.

The Penta helix approach underscores the importance of integrating academic expertise, corporate responsibility, community participation, governmental leadership, and media influence in combating terrorism (Subagyo, 2021). It aligns with broader counter-terrorism frameworks that emphasise understanding terrorist strategies, such as attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding, as well as the sociopolitical drivers of radicalisation, including personal motivations, group dynamics, and societal context (Kydd & Walter, 2006; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017).

Strategic communication plays a pivotal role in enhancing counter-terrorism effectiveness. Rather than relying solely on repressive measures, soft power, such as counter-narratives and counter-ideology, has shown greater potential to mitigate radicalisation (Setiyono & Rasyid, 2022; Tella, 2017). Equally important is ensuring that counter-terrorism efforts respect human rights while promoting youth empowerment, public education, and community-based surveillance (Mutungi & Mulu, 2021). Effective counter-terrorism also depends on regional cooperation across state boundaries (Bala & Tar, 2021).

The Penta helix model has increasingly been applied to address Indonesia's broader security challenges, including radicalism, communism, liberalism, and separatism (Sudiana, Sule, Soemaryani, & Yunizar, 2020). The National Defense Council formally adopted it as a collaborative framework for inter-sectoral synergy. Effective implementation of this model depends on the active participation of all sectors, including government bodies, educational institutions, civil society, business actors, and media platforms.

Scholars have underscored the importance of adapting the Penta helix model to regional contexts. The involvement of local actors, particularly religious leaders and institutions, has proven effective in promoting moderation, equality, and tolerance, thereby reducing the appeal of religious extremism (Ibrahim, Prasojo, & Sulaiman, 2019). As radical ideologies often operate through psychological and familial channels, early intervention at both individual and community levels is critical (Takdir, Basri, & Sidik, 2024; Toyibah, 2022).

The literature review supports the relevance of the Penta helix model. Christawan et al. (2023) demonstrated its applicability in countering extremism in Papua. Subagyo (2021) identified limited media and business participation as key obstacles in BNPT's deradicalisation programs. Firmansyah et al. (2022) and Moento et al. (2023) advocated strengthening stakeholder capacity and communication in radical-prone regions like Papua and Poso. Further contributions by Kurnia et al. (2023) and Khudsifi et al. (2024) emphasised structural and regulatory constraints that hinder stakeholder coordination.

Building on these insights, this study focuses on Surabaya—a city with a complex legacy of terrorist incidents and ideological infiltration. Unlike existing research centred on Papua or Poso, this study addresses two underexplored challenges in implementing the Penta helix model: the limited participation of the business sector and the absence of gender mainstreaming. Accordingly, the study aims to analyze the operationalisation of the Penta helix model in Surabaya's counter-terrorism efforts, identify key challenges stakeholders face, and offer strategic recommendations to strengthen inter-organisational synergy.

The research adopts a qualitative descriptive-exploratory design, combining semi-structured interviews and literature analysis to capture the complexity of stakeholder interactions and contextual barriers (Kooli, 2023). The research team selected informants through purposive sampling to ensure representation from government agencies, academic institutions, religious organisations, community groups, media outlets, and business actors. Thematic analysis guided the data interpretation process, allowing the researchers to extract patterns related to perceptions, implementation challenges, and proposed solutions (Sarosa, 2021). The study employed triangulation by cross-validating primary data with secondary sources such as government reports and academic publications.

The study engaged nine key institutions: the Surabaya National Unity and Political Agency (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik/Bakesbangpol), Surabaya City Police, Surabaya Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI Surabaya), Surabaya branch of Muhammadiyah, Surabaya branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Universitas Pembangunan Nasional (UPN) Veteran East Java, Radio Republic Indonesia (RRI Surabaya), East Java Security and Order Awareness Group (Pokdarkamtibmas), and *Ustadz* Abu Fida.

These institutions contributed critical insights into the strengths and weaknesses of current collaborative efforts in countering radicalism. To ensure depth and relevance, the research employed purposive sampling to select informants with substantial expertise and active involvement in counter-terrorism efforts in Surabaya. Through interviews and secondary data analysis, the study captured grounded perspectives from high-ranking officials, scholars, religious leaders, media professionals, and civil society representatives. This methodological approach enabled a comprehensive analysis of the Penta helix model's efficacy and operational challenges.

This study offers a novel contribution by focusing on Surabaya, a city with a complex history of terrorist activity and ideological infiltration. Unlike previous research in Papua or Poso, this study explores underexamined issues such as limited private sector engagement and the absence of gender-sensitive approaches in Penta helix implementation. The analysis aims to advance current discourse by providing context-specific insights that inform policy and practice.

## 2. The Perceptions of Surabaya Stakeholders Regarding the Threat of Radicalism and Terrorism

There is a broad consensus among stakeholders in Surabaya that extremism and terrorism remain significant threats. Law enforcement authorities identify extremism as a precursor to terrorism, noting that exposure to radical ideologies increases the likelihood of individuals engaging in terrorist activities. They emphasise that radicalism is not only ideologically deviant but also a foundational stage in the escalation toward terrorism. Empirical findings from the police indicate a recent rise in the activities of radical groups in Surabaya. Although groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) have been officially disbanded, they persist informally, as demonstrated by the continued publication of the Kaffah newsletter. Additionally, radical influences have been detected within educational institutions, such as the infiltration of Jamaah Islamiyah at a state university mosque, facilitated by alumni of the institution (Sari, personal communication, July 10, 2023).

Despite a reported decline in radical and terrorist incidents, the police stress that recruitment and indoctrination efforts persist, particularly targeting youth. Groups such as Wahabi-affiliated movements, Khilafatul Muslimin, HTI, and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) continue disseminating ideology, often via non-violent but persuasive means (Sari, personal communication, July 10, 2023). Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (Bakesbangpol) Surabaya echoes this concern, identifying radicalism and terrorism as persistent threats. It has flagged organisations such as Khilafatul Muslimin for promoting ideologies that conflict with the foundational principles of the Indonesian state. Moreover, Bakesbangpol has observed varying degrees of success in deradicalisation efforts, with some former convicts only partially disengaging from extremist views (Santoso & Waqot, personal communication, August 8, 2023). Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) Surabaya acknowledges the presence of radical elements and emphasises vigilance in avoiding affiliation with extremist groups. The organisation actively curates its interview sources to exclude individuals from HTI or FPI, aiming to prevent the misuse of public media platforms for spreading radical ideologies (Umar, Winahyu, Noor, & Afnani, personal communication, July 4, 2023).

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Surabaya reports the existence of radical movements both before and after the Reformasi era. These movements aim to weaken NU's role as a pillar of religious moderation in Indonesia. A study conducted by NU Surabaya identifies Salafi-oriented groups advocating for a caliphate as particularly destabilising. Both NU and Muhammadiyah stress that terrorism and extremism are incompatible with Islamic teachings and endanger national unity. Muhammadiyah emphasises the need for nuanced strategies that address the root causes of radicalisation, without attributing extremism to any specific religion (Ridlwani, personal communication, August 8, 2023).

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) Surabaya shares the government's concern, identifying two primary dimensions of radicalism: physical threats and ideological subversion. MUI Surabaya has declared groups such as HTI and FPI as inconsistent with authentic Islamic teachings, particularly due to their promotion of the Khilafah concept. It questions the legitimacy and clarity of leadership within these movements and warns against their potential to undermine national ideology. MUI also recalls

the 2018 Surabaya terrorist attacks, which targeted churches and police institutions, as a stark reminder of the continuing threat (Ali, Karim, & Diyar, personal communication, July 24, 2023).

The East Java Community for Public Security Awareness (Pokdarkamtibmas) in Surabaya has observed that global terrorist trends have influenced the formation of local radical groups. Although operational activity has decreased, the influence of radical preachers who challenge pluralistic religious practices remains a concern. Pokdarkamtibmas identifies groups advocating for constitutional change as extremist threats. They also note that increasing digital connectivity and population mobility have made monitoring more difficult (Arqam, personal communication, July 15, 2023). A UPN "Veteran" East Java academic adds that the youth are especially vulnerable to indoctrination due to their idealism and curiosity. This susceptibility is exacerbated in communities experiencing socio-economic inequalities, creating fertile ground for radical recruitment (Hidayat, personal communication, July 3, 2023).

In a nutshell, stakeholder perspectives in Surabaya converge on the view that extremism, through radicalisation, is a fundamental driver of terrorism. Although the frequency of terrorist incidents has declined, the persistent spread of radical ideologies, especially among the youth, remains a serious concern. Groups like HTI, Khilafatul Muslimin, and FPI continue to operate informally, despite government bans. Institutions such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI affirm their commitment to Islamic moderation and collaborate with state agencies in combating radicalism. However, ongoing challenges include ideological infiltration in educational settings, limited stakeholder coordination, and insufficient early prevention mechanisms. Strengthened inter-agency cooperation is essential to safeguard ideological resilience and social stability in Surabaya.

### 3. Implementation of Penta helix Strategy Cooperation in Surabaya

Implementing the Pentahelix strategy in Surabaya involves collaboration between five main stakeholders: the government, academia, media, civil society, and the private sector. This collaborative governance model is applied to various efforts such as strengthening religious moderation, early detection of radicalism, deradicalisation, reintegration of ex-terrorists, and public education on tolerance. Through joint programs, these sectors synergise to foster a culture of peace and vigilance against extremism in urban communities.

Community organisations, particularly Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), are at the forefront of counter-radicalism efforts by promoting religious moderation. They conduct structured religious education and dissemination activities to resist exclusive religious interpretations. These programs are carried out in formal institutions and community-based settings in collaboration with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, local governments, and security forces (Sari, personal communication, July 10, 2023).

Academic institutions such as UPN "Veteran" East Java are active actors in counter-radicalism through education. One of their initiatives is the establishment of "Warung NKRI," a public space used to organise dialogue, discussions, film screenings, poster exhibitions, and seminars with themes related to the dangers of radicalism and the importance of national values. This initiative is guided by trained facilitators with civic education and counter-terrorism backgrounds, many of whom have served in the military or police.

Universities also play a role in preventing campus radicalism by developing anti-radicalism modules integrated into courses like Civic Education and Religious Studies. These modules are both academic and project-based, encouraging students to develop creative campaigns about nationalism and tolerance. Collaborations with BNPT and Densus 88 are also conducted through joint forums to exchange information and prevent radical groups from infiltrating campus communities (Sari, personal communication, July 10, 2023).

In addition to educational content, universities help detect signs of radicalisation among students. When student movements, mosque activities, or classroom discussions exhibit symptoms of intolerance or exclusivism, lecturers and university officials usually conduct counselling and, if needed, report the

issue to relevant institutions. This mechanism allows early intervention before radicalism becomes more deeply rooted.

The Surabaya City Government, through the National Unity and Politics Agency (Bakesbangpol), also plays an active role by institutionalising rehabilitation and reintegration programs. These initiatives are aimed towards individuals who have served sentences for terrorism-related crimes, as well as their families. In addition to coaching and entrepreneurship assistance, educational scholarships are provided for the children of former terrorists so they can pursue formal education and break the cycle of extremism (Fida, personal communication, September 2, 2023).

Symbolic activities are also conducted to help former terrorists regain their social identity and civic pride. For example, Bakesbangpol's Task Force Asuhan Rembulan involves former radicals in ceremonies such as the Indonesian Independence Day, where they wear red and white uniforms and sing the national anthem. This symbolic engagement helps transform their self-perception and affirms their belonging to the nation-state.

Mass media also contribute by spreading counter-narratives through various channels. RRI Surabaya, in partnership with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, oversees the vetting of religious materials and works with preachers to ensure moderation in religious discourse. The station also broadcasts real-life stories of former terrorists, survivors of terror attacks, and the devastating impact of radical ideologies on families and communities (Umar et al., personal communication, July 4, 2023).

RRI's broadcasts are not limited to formal events but are embedded into popular programs such as "Ngaji Kebangsaan" and "Religi Nusantara," which reach diverse listener demographics. These segments are designed to provide moral education rooted in Indonesian culture and counteract the influence of online radical propaganda. RRI becomes a key actor in the production and dissemination of deradicalisation narratives of these activities.

At the community level, informal actors such as Pokdarkamtibmas (Community Awareness Groups for Security and Order) detect suspicious activities early. Although they cannot act directly on terrorism cases, they report unusual religious gatherings or exclusivist preaching to local authorities. Their observations are especially critical in suburban and peri-urban areas where state surveillance is limited (Arqam, personal communication, July 15, 2023).

These community-level efforts are complemented by structured collaboration between key stakeholders through coordination meetings organised by Bakesbangpol. These meetings involve BNPT, Densus 88, the judiciary, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), and local governments to formulate strategies and evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing programs. One concrete output of this coordination is the synchronisation of religious curricula in boarding schools with the national guidelines for religious moderation (Santoso & Waqot, personal communication, August 8, 2023).

MUI Surabaya is involved in policy consultation and grassroots religious guidance. In cooperation with NU and Muhammadiyah, MUI organises training for imams, teachers of religion, and mosque administrators to ensure sermons and religious instruction support the values of tolerance and anti-violence. In addition, MUI endorses the establishment of "kampung moderasi beragama" or religious moderation villages, where inclusive religious practices are showcased (Ali et al., personal communication, July 24, 2023).

Nonetheless, obstacles remain in implementing the Penta helix plan in Surabaya. One of the main issues is the limited involvement of the private sector, which has the potential to support counter-radicalism through corporate social responsibility and workplace-based education. Moreover, the absence of gender perspectives in most deradicalisation and prevention programs weakens the long-term impact of these initiatives, especially since women often act as moral gatekeepers in families.

Another challenge is the persistence of sectoral egotism among stakeholders, where institutions prioritise their agendas over collaborative goals. It often leads to overlapping programs, a lack of data integration, and competition for public visibility rather than genuine cooperation. To address these problems, a more effective coordination framework with clearly defined responsibilities and common success indicators is required.

#### 4. The Obstacle in Collaborative Efforts Across Local Stakeholders in Surabaya

Stakeholders in Surabaya report that several obstacles hinder cooperative efforts to address extremism and terrorism. Some have expressed concerns about the inadequate collaboration between institutions in combating radicalism and terrorism. The police emphasise the importance of implementing the RANPE (National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) initiative and acknowledge existing cooperation among various parties. However, stakeholders have not yet successfully executed RANPE, resulting in insufficient collaboration. To address this, the police recommend establishing effective communication channels and coordination structures and holding regular meetings at designated venues. The failure to operationalise the RANPE framework has likely led to redundant and fragmented coordination among the involved parties. The police report that the anti-radicalism and anti-terrorism strategies currently in place are not well integrated. In this regard, the police stated:

“We have discussed related issues many times. Many investigations have shown that the problem of official work cannot be handled by one party. This RANPE was issued so that it does not run independently. The RANPE will contain the tasks of the campus, the police, BNPT, religious leaders, and religious organisations ...” (Sari, Personal Communication, July 10, 2023).

Additionally, the police observed that many counter-radicalism events have been ceremonial rather than substantive. For instance, with a formal ceremony, BNPT and UPN “Veteran” East Java launched the “Warung NKRI” initiative. However, reports indicate that some individuals involved had prior convictions for terrorism-related offences. Due to the business sector’s lack of mentorship and guidance, these individuals discontinued their entrepreneurial activities, even losing the assets and capital provided. As the police explained:

“There are many obstacles to doing good business and being responsible for capital incentives from the police and government. There is no guidance on how to do this. This is what I think is lacking.” (Sari, personal communication, July 10, 2023).

Surabaya’s Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) has also expressed concern over funding challenges. Although the city government provided facilities like a new office building and an operational vehicle, financial support is not allocated in a lump sum. Instead, MUI must submit a formal proposal for each activity. This requirement limits the organisation’s ability to plan and implement programs effectively. A representative from MUI explained:

“The main obstacle is still in the budget. Then, when there’s an event, we submit a proposal. The government gives us something in writing, not money. That’s our obstacle. Our movement is narrow because we want to move.” (Ali, Karim, & Diyar, personal communication, July 14, 2023).

This issue presents a hurdle for MUI Surabaya because it restricts its ability to organise various activities owing to financial constraints. Despite their efforts, such as hosting seminars and coaching sessions at multiple mosques throughout Surabaya, the problem of extremism and terrorism persists.

The NU Surabaya branch highlighted ego-sectoral issues among organisations as a barrier to collaboration. Programs accepted by one organisation may be rejected by another, preventing unified action. As one NU representative stated:

“...sectoral egos such as the city government inviting NU, Muhammadiyah, and Al-Irsyad — each has its ego, and they don’t align. Muhammadiyah may not accept a program accepted by NU, and vice versa. The question is, how can we get everyone to agree?” (Toha, personal communication, July 8, 2023).

Meanwhile, RRI Surabaya reported that they have not experienced major obstacles in their broadcasting efforts and have successfully collaborated with other agencies to provide quality

speakers. Nonetheless, they acknowledged the growing threat of misinformation spread by online media. As RRI representatives noted:

“It’s just that often the obstacle is the presence of online media that we have to anticipate.” (Umar, Winahyu, Noor, & Afnani, personal communication, July 4, 2023).

In educational settings, the implementation of anti-radicalism programs remains reactive rather than proactive, often initiated only after incidents such as bombings or the recruitment of students into radical movements. Although institutions like the BNPT have been established to address these concerns, many academic institutions still lack a structured curriculum focused on counter-extremism. Some state universities in Surabaya no longer offer dedicated Pancasila courses; instead, they embed them within broader citizenship education. This inconsistency weakens the foundational understanding of state ideology. As Professor Syarif from UPN Veteran East Java remarked:

“There are several universities where Pancasila education used to be offered, but no longer is. I don’t need to mention which universities. They are state universities in Surabaya. It is a consistency problem. Even though it is called Pancasila education, which is the foundation of the state.” (Hidayat, personal communication, July 3, 2023).

Another major shortcoming in stakeholder collaboration is the minimal involvement of the business sector in addressing radicalism and terrorism. As part of the Penta helix framework, businesses are supposed to play a pivotal role alongside government, academics, civil society, and media. While other sectors have demonstrated active involvement, the business community remains largely absent. According to Ustadz Abu Fida:

“That’s all that’s important; the business world is missing. If we look for where the business or CSR is, we never hear about it. It didn’t exist before. Training was provided at Shopee and Tokopedia, but there was no follow-up. We went back to the manual.” (Fida, personal communication, September 2, 2023).

In 2019, the Surabaya City Government, in cooperation with a state-owned enterprise, launched training programs for former terrorism convicts. These were designed to help them manage online businesses. However, the initiative lacked sustainability, and no follow-up support was provided. Additionally, there are no corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds allocated for the reintegration of former terrorist offenders. These efforts are sustained primarily through individual initiatives rather than institutional collaboration. The police acknowledged the issue and cautioned that if the business sector does not act positively, it may assist in radicalisation. One case in point is the Hijrah Fest in Surabaya, which the police claim had to be cancelled due to concerns about it becoming a platform for radical ideas (Sari, personal communication, July 10, 2023).

Another significant gap in Surabaya’s counter-terrorism strategy is the absence of gender mainstreaming, even though women and children were directly involved in the 2018 suicide bombings carried out by a family. In various cases, women serve both as passive supporters and as active agents of violence. Thus, their full, equal, and meaningful participation is essential in counter-terrorism efforts.

In October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). It consists of 4 pillars that link women to the peace and security agenda in an armed conflict that impacts women and girls. It acknowledges the need for women’s active roles and participation in conflict resolution, including pre-conflict, during and post-conflict; from preventive roles, protection during and after conflict (peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding), and other specific needs during repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, and post-conflict resolution (United Nations, 2019). These steps also apply to deradicalisation and counter-terrorism efforts.

The Indonesian government adopted the National Action Plan (NAP) through Presidential Decree No.7 in 2021. In the implementation, BNPT adopts and tries to localise the WPS agenda through NAP on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (UN Women, 2022). It led to the Peace Village Foundation, and there are already 30 Peace Villages in Indonesia in 2020 (Vulovik,



2022), excluding Surabaya. Partnership and cooperation between stakeholders, from national authorities to local communities and civil society, are needed during the localisation of the NAP effort at the provincial and regional levels. It also requires the full support of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) to strengthen the NAP's gender mainstreaming and monitor its implementation.

Collaborative efforts among stakeholders in Surabaya to address extremism and terrorism still face various obstacles, mainly related to the suboptimal implementation of the RANPE framework, ceremonial coordination, and limited business sector involvement. Despite implementing initiatives such as Warung NKRI and economic rehabilitation programs, the absence of continuous mentoring has resulted in the program's failure. Furthermore, sectoral ego constraints between organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah impede the desired synergy level among the designed programs. The issue of budgetary constraints represents an additional challenge for MUI Surabaya, which is required to submit a distinct proposal for each activity. Conversely, media outlets such as RRI Surabaya are pivotal in preventing extremism and terrorism. However, they face significant challenges from internet media platforms that disseminate misinformation. Furthermore, the incorporation of a gender perspective in counter-terrorism initiatives in Surabaya remains limited, despite the involvement of women in terrorist acts, such as the 2018 Surabaya bombing, underscoring the necessity for gender mainstreaming. Improved coordination, business sector involvement, gender mainstreaming, and robust policy support are crucial to enhance the efficacy of countering extremism and terrorism in Surabaya.

## **5. Challenges, Gaps, and Strategic Insights in Penta helix Cooperation for Counter-terrorism in Surabaya**

This research study examines the implementation of collaborative cooperation between parties in Surabaya to address the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism in the city. By employing the Penta helix framework, the author identifies patterns and obstacles in the collaborative efforts of stakeholders in Surabaya to address radicalism and terrorism. The findings of this study serve to augment and extend research on the implementation of Penta helix collaboration in countering radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. For instance, the present study shares notable parallels with the works of Subagyo (2021) and Kurnia et al., (2023). These studies underscore the pivotal role of cross-stakeholder collaboration in addressing radicalism and terrorism at the national level. However, this research differs from the studies conducted by Subagyo and Kurnia et al., in that it emphasises the local context and the challenges faced in Surabaya. Consequently, the research can contribute to advancing the study of implementing penta helix cooperation in countering radicalism and terrorism. Furthermore, by focusing on research in Surabaya, this study contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the implementation of the Penta helix model in countering radicalism and terrorism at the regional level, as evidenced by studies in Papua (Christawan et al., 2023; Firmansyah et al., 2022) and Poso (Moento et al., 2023).

The study identified several key findings, including the suboptimal role of the business world, budget constraints, and the persistent challenges related to sectoral ego problems in Penta helix in Surabaya. These findings are consistent with those of Khudzaifi et al., (2024), who identified general deficiencies in the collaborative governance of countering violent extremism in Indonesia. However, in contrast to previous research findings, our study reveals a paucity of women's involvement and the absence of gender mainstreaming in local policies. This significant finding has not been previously addressed in the existing Penta helix studies. A lacuna is also evident in the implementation of the Penta helix model in the context of Surabaya, where terrorist incidents involving women and children occurred in 2018.

While the present study concentrates on Surabaya, the findings are confirmed. It contributes to the body of knowledge on the obstacles to cross-sector collaboration in addressing radicalism and terrorism, particularly in Indonesia. Several recent studies on countering radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia demonstrate that cross-sectoral cooperation faces various obstacles. Anindya's study (2024)

revealed that numerous civil society organisations engaged in countering violent extremism continue to exhibit a paucity of coordination and a dearth of a unified framework.

Research by Agastia (2020) also confirmed that implementing cooperation between the government and civil society is necessary for handling violent extremism. This phenomenon occurs because civil society groups possess the capacity to access populations that are challenging for the government to reach. However, Agastia's research indicates a persistent absence of coordination between the government and civil society groups within this context. The state's centralised nature continues to predominate in the handling of violent extremism. The absence of coordination among stakeholders in Indonesia is exemplified by Sumpter's research (2020), which emphasises the disorganisation surrounding the assessment of terrorism prisoners by these stakeholders. Government agencies, law enforcement, and civil society organisations employ distinct criteria when evaluating individuals convicted of terrorism-related crimes. Sumpter proposed a streamlined assessment framework that would be utilised by all relevant parties in the process of deradicalising terrorism prisoners.

In the article "Counter-terrorism in Asia," Gunaratna comprehensively analyses the subject. The state partnership with civil society organisations extends to Southeast Asia. Gunaratna's discourse encompasses the collaboration between BNPT and civil society organisations in counter-terrorism, particularly emphasising rehabilitation and re-education. His research also discussed several NGOs that train prisoners and their families in entrepreneurship. In the training context, several cities were cited, including Lamongan, Semarang, and Palu, but not Surabaya. However, according to Gunaratna's research from 2013, there was a lack of cooperation among these stakeholders. Gunaratna has asserted that the efforts to counter radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia are characterised by an absence of a structured, comprehensive approach, with initiatives often being implemented on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, according to Gunaratna (2021), the WGWC (Working Group on Women and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism) community could have been more effectively utilised to prevent family terrorism in Surabaya in 2018.

The study by Jamhari & Testriono (2021) also demonstrates that cooperation between the state and civil society is crucial in addressing radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. Civil society groups can influence the effectiveness of government programs in addressing radicalism and terrorism. The presence of civil society organisations, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), serves as a crucial stakeholder against the influence of radical and pro-terrorism groups within the community. Civil society groups have the potential to serve as a counter-narrative to radical groups. In the Islamic context, civil society organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah play a pivotal role in countering radical ideologies by leveraging the tools of da'wah and education. However, these organisations encounter their unique challenges. Among these challenges is the infiltration of radical groups into mosques or forums that these organisations have. A further challenge to these civil society groups is their waning authority among the ummah, particularly concerning political matters. Conversely, radical groups can garner public attention on political issues.

Our research, particularly in the context of Surabaya, has the potential to provide further insights that could contribute to a more robust understanding of the phenomenon under study. A review of research on countering radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia reveals several challenges and obstacles. These include a lack of coordination between governments, the absence of assessment instruments that can be used in conjunction, and the challenge of infiltration by radical groups. This review also examines obstacles to implementing countering radicalism and terrorism in Surabaya.

An alternative perspective emerges from the research findings conducted by Zakuan & Seniwati (2021). According to Zakuan and Seniwati, the government of Indonesia has effectively addressed the challenges posed by radicalism and terrorism by implementing collaborative initiatives with relevant stakeholders. The government of Indonesia established the National Counter-terrorism Agency (BNPT) to collaborate with various religious organisations, youth organisations, regional organisations, pesantren, schools, universities, media outlets, and religious leaders. Furthermore, the BNPT has established an entrepreneurship program to assist former terrorism prisoners in securing economic

independence. Zakuan & Seniwati (2021) also stated that a women's empowerment program in seaweed cultivation activities has been implemented in South Sulawesi to improve the welfare of family life. Consequently, this step will mitigate the likelihood of family involvement in radicalism and terrorism. According to Zakuan & Seniwati, these programs have contributed to Indonesia's relative success in countering radicalism and terrorism. Despite the findings of Zakuan and Seniwati's research indicating the efficacy of programs to counter radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia, a critical examination reveals a general overview of stakeholder coordination, devoid of the depth and specificity essential for a comprehensive analysis. Conversely, research conducted in the context of Surabaya, in conjunction with other studies in Indonesia, has demonstrated the existence of various challenges in the management of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia.

The results show that there are still many operational and structural obstacles preventing the Penta helix model from being effectively implemented in Surabaya to combat terrorism and radicalism. The absence of gender mainstreaming, budgetary restrictions among key stakeholders, and the incomplete integration of the business sector highlight the fragmented nature of the collaborative approach. As demonstrated by the brief "*Warung NKRI*" effort, the private sector's limited involvement in funding rehabilitation programs for ex-terrorists highlights the need for ongoing financial and mentoring assistance to guarantee long-term economic reintegration and sustainability.

The business sector's role in this Penta helix cooperation remains underdeveloped, with a paucity of initiatives. To date, the involvement and participation of the business sector in counter-terrorism and radicalism have been limited to government-initiated programs, wherein the government functions as a facilitator. However, the government's role as a facilitator is largely ceremonial and lacks sustainability. The government's role, as a facilitator, is limited to assisting without fostering sustainable coordination with the business sector. Consequently, the business sector's participation in the penta helix concept remains underdeveloped, despite its pivotal role and irreplaceable position within the system. Sectoral ego clashes and bureaucratic obstacles between governmental and religious institutions further complicate coordination attempts. Some organisations' unwillingness to completely integrate their programs with the larger counter-radicalisation agenda has led to overlapping projects and inefficient use of resources. However, the growing power of uncontrolled digital platforms that aid in the dissemination of extremist propaganda continues to pose a threat to media organisations like RRI Surabaya, which have been actively involved in spreading counter-radicalism narratives.

The absence of a gender-sensitive counter-terrorism approach is one of the most significant weaknesses in the current plan. Even though women actively participated in terrorism, especially in the Surabaya bombings in 2018, current policies and programs have not fully integrated women as agents and beneficiaries of counter-radicalism initiatives. The lack of gender-responsive tactics contradicts global best practices, including the UN's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Taking a more proactive and inclusive stance is imperative in light of these difficulties. For stakeholders to work together more effectively, the National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Extremism (RANPE) must be fully implemented. Furthermore, Surabaya will be more resilient to terrorism and radicalism if the business sector's role is institutionalised through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, early prevention initiatives are strengthened, and gender perspectives are incorporated into counter-terrorism efforts.

To effectively implement counter-terrorism via the penta helix model, a primary recommendation is to decentralise the legal framework from the national (RANPE) to the regional level (Perda). The city of Purwakarta launched this program, which Surabaya may consider a model. The execution of the legal framework is facilitated by collaboration among stakeholders engaged in counter-terrorism initiatives. It is essential to augment the quantity and capability of female law enforcement officers, or those cognizant of the significance of gender equality, to address the rising incidence of female terrorists, which has escalated following the strategic shift of ISIS and its affiliates in Indonesia. In this instance, deradicalisation and disengagement initiatives must encompass multiple stakeholders, using psychological support and religious methodologies within correctional facilities to extricate inmates from their affiliations.

Furthermore, concerning the participation of business entities, it may be integrated into the entrepreneurial or alternative development program that corresponds with the educational qualifications of the former terrorists. BNPT may allocate former terrorists' land for the establishment of coffee plantations, engage with colleges to offer coffee cultivation training and partner with corporate entities for product commercialisation. It can also be implemented in several areas, including mining, fishing, agriculture, and others. An additional crucial element is the establishment of a supportive social milieu through the engagement of NGOs and the community in reintegration initiatives for former terrorists, exemplified by the Peace Village program developed by the Wahid Foundation and UN Women to foster interfaith harmony, peace, and community resilience on a larger scale.

## 6. Conclusions

The study reveals important insights into implementing the Penta helix model in countering radicalism and terrorism in Surabaya. The main finding is that, while the model successfully engages several key stakeholders—namely, the government, academia, media, civil society, and the business sector—the application remains fragmented. The business sector's involvement is notably underdeveloped, with limited financial support and inadequate integration into the collaborative process. Furthermore, gender mainstreaming remains an overlooked aspect in the design and implementation of counter-radicalism initiatives.

The research contributes significantly to understanding the Penta helix model in the context of Surabaya. It provides localised insights into how this collaborative framework can be applied to combat radicalism and terrorism, identifying both opportunities and challenges. The study expands upon existing literature by focusing on the practical application of the Penta helix model at the local level, addressing the gap in understanding the dynamics and constraints at the regional level. Notably, it introduces the need for more proactive, gender-sensitive, and business sector-inclusive strategies in counter-terrorism initiatives, thereby offering new perspectives on the roles of various stakeholders.

While the study offers valuable insights, it is not without limitations. The qualitative nature of the research restricts its generalisability, and the study could not fully explore the roles and contributions of all stakeholders, particularly the business sector. The inability to interview the Mayor of Surabaya, a crucial policymaker, further limits the depth of the findings. Additionally, the research did not exhaustively examine all potential business sector involvement in counter-terrorism efforts, highlighting an area for further investigation. Future research should seek to expand on these gaps, particularly by exploring the roles of business entities in more detail and integrating quantitative data to provide a more comprehensive view of stakeholder collaboration.

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